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In 1903 Lenin along with Julius Martov founded the newspaper Iskra, which was later to 
become Pravda. At the time, Lenin was a ferocious advocate of a free press and free 
political discourse. After coming to power we find Lenin addressing a Moscow crowd in 
1920 with the words “Why should any man be allowed to buy a printing press and 
disseminate pernicious opinions calculated to embarrass the government?” Lenin is not 
alone in the frenzied attention he paid to controlling speech. In 1971 and 1974 the US 
Congress passed limits on campaign spending by candidates to the House and Senate and 
outlawed spending by private citizens wishing to express their private views during 
elections. In its 1976 Buckley v. Valeo ruling the Supreme Court ruled that campaign 
spending limits violated the First Amendment’s protection of free speech, but ever since 
some congressmen and senators, and activist groups such as Common Cause, have sought 
to amend the constitution to limit campaign spending and replace private funding of 
elections by state funding.  
 
The huge attention campaign finances have won from the media and politicians is due to 
the fear that money can buy elections and that money can buy political favours. Research 
on campaign spending and contributions has as a result focused on the effect of spending 
on votes, and on asking what determines how much money a candidate has to spend.  
 
Effect of Campaign Spending on Votes 
 
As in almost any field of social and physical sciences, empirical work precedes theory. 
The question on the lips of early researchers was how to estimate the effect of campaign 
spending on political success. The natural approach was to run a regression of campaign 
of voteshare on spending and other control variables such as whether a candidate was an 
incumbent or a challenger on the candidate’s share of votes in an election. The first to 
exploit datasets on campaign spending made available by campaign spending laws was 
Kristian Palda (1973) who used simple OLS to show that for Quebec provincial elections 
campaign spending was more powerful at the margin for challengers than for incumbents and that incumbents seem to start their races with a committed bloc of voters. Using US 
House of Representatives data from the 1974 elections Gary Jacobson (1978) found the  
seemingly extreme result that incumbent spending had almost no effect at all at the 
margin. This result has provoked disbelief among political scientists, but it is not a 
mystery if we take it that incumbents have low to zero marginal costs of raising extra 
dollars, as Coates (1998) has pointed out. In such a case they will spend money until the 
marginal return, as measured by votes, falls to zero.  
 
A string of papers throughout the 1980’s from different countries (summarized in Palda 
2000) seemed to confirm the Jacobson findings. These papers are cross-sectional, focus 
mainly on district level data and are almost completely divorced from time-series 
regressions that seek to explain votes by cycles in government spending (such as those in 
the tradition of Kramer 1971). These findings became the most investigated and 
contested “stylized facts” about campaign spending. At issue were the claims of 
politicians that campaign spending limits were in the public interest and the doubts raised 
by public choice scholars that these limits served as artificial barriers to entry in the 
political market. As Abrams and Settle (1978) write 
 
Rational, self-interested individuals, groups, or industries seek regulation as a 
means of serving their own private interests… When regulation has the 
potential for directly affecting the legislators themselves (e.g. political 
campaign regulations), the economic approach [to regulation] suggests that 
the regulation would be designed to serve the legislators’ interest rather than 
some vaguely defined ‘public interest’.  
 
Jacobson and others (Palda and Palda 1985) wove a story to explain why, if true, these 
results could help understand incumbents’ universal eagerness to pass a spending limit. 
An incumbent  during his or her tenure in office uses the government frank and paid 
research and support staff to run a continuous election campaign. Come election time the 
incumbent may have exhausted the potential of money to enlighten voters on his or her 
performance and  policy views. Challengers are usually less well known, and a long tradition of empirical studies summarized in Jacobson (1990) suggests that challenger 
spending at the margin is more potent than incumbent spending in getting votes. The 
reason is that voters, even though they may not wish to elect the challenger, demand to 
know their alternatives to the incumbent, and may give some support to the challenger, 
provided the challenger is not too unacceptable, in order to discipline the incumbent. A 
spending limit thus may not harm the incumbent, but may prevent the challenger from 
dispelling basic doubts in voter minds about his or her integrity and policy positions.  
 
The lack of any study that could tie the political profits from campaign spending limits to 
how legislators vote on those limits does not allow public choice scholars to make 
conclusive pronouncements on the motives for such limits. We must depend on an 
unproved model to mediate between data on marginal productivity of spending and 
conclusions about candidate motives for passing spending limits. In this tradition Bender 
(1988) showed that candidates who voted for the 1974 spending limits in Congress were 
also those with the lowest marginal products of campaign spending. In countries that 
impose spending limits it is hard to find any sudden rise in the votes of incumbents. The 
problem with this conclusion, as I explained in Palda (1996), is that spending limits may 
give incumbents a potential advantage in votes which they choose to “spend” by giving 
favours to special interest groups. They will give such favours until their voteshares fall 
back to where they were before the limits. In other words, spending limits may influence 
policy more than they influence votes. Palda’s theory suggests that spending limits will 
have an effect on policy. In what is perhaps the first empirical study that seeks to find 
how spending limits influence policy Crain et al. (1990) concluded that US states which 
have spending limits in state elections are more likely to pass regulations (off budget 
spending) than are states without spending limits. These latter states are likelier than 
spending limit states to have higher on-budget spending.   
 
The dispute over whether incumbent or challenger marginal products are greater and 
whether money has any effect on electoral outcomes has put money into the pockets of 
some scholars preoccupied with this question. Dozens of court cases challenging or 
seeking to enforce spending limits have called on these scholars as experts. There is perhaps no area of public choice which feels a greater demand for its expert services than 
the campaign spending area. What guarantees employment for the experts is that few can 
agree on what is the effect of spending on votes. As early as the 1970’s researchers felt 
that OLS was not an appropriate way of estimate vote production functions. Money may 
get votes, but anticipated votes get money from contributors. Research on the  
simultaneity between campaign spending and votes has gone through two phases. The 
first phase, launched by Palda (1975) and carries on by the work of Jacobson (1980, 
1985, 1990) and Green and Krasno (1988) has sought different instruments for campaign 
spending that would allow identification of the voters equation. Depending on the use of 
instrument one could find, as Jacobson has that challenger spending is roughly twice as 
powerful at the margin as incumbent spending. Green and Krasno (1988) used past 
expenditures as an instrument for current expenditures and found that in general 
incumbent and challenger spending have equal marginal productivity. The second phase 
of research as exemplified by Levitt (1994) and  Milyo (1998) warns that instrumental 
variables used in the first-phase studies of simultaneity are likely to be correlated with 
omitted variables and provide what is perhaps the best critique of empirical work in the 
field to date. The omission of forces correlated with instrumented variable may 
exaggerate the importance of those variables.  
 
The magnitude of campaign spending may not be the only factor that influences votes. 
The diversity and concentration of the campaign contributions that give rise to campaign 
spending may also influence votes. Theoretical support for this idea goes back to 
Madison and Montesquieu, but has more recently been elaborated by Potters et al. (1997) 
and Dharmapalla and Palda (2002). Palda and Palda (1998) found that in French 
parliamentary elections candidates who relied on their own funds to finance their 
campaigns tended to receive fewer votes. Dharmapalla and Palda  found that the greater 
was the concentration of contributions to challengers or open seat candidates in US 
House elections, the fewer votes those candidates tended to receive. The significance of 
this research is that it contradicts the 1976 US Supreme Court Buckley v. Valeo ruling 
that contributions are not a form of speech and therefore may be limited by law.  
 The Sources of Spending 
 
Campaign spending is not possible without a contributor. In the US, private contributors 
dominate government contributions to campaigns. A booming branch of public choice is 
to show the link between contributions to candidates and the types of votes they make in 
Congress. US data is perhaps the most suited to finding whether contributions buy 
political favours. In most European countries (Gunlicks 1993) governments subsidies 
dominate elections. In those countries where private contributions are tolerated, party 
discipline prevails and it is difficult to hold that the individual representative has much 
say of his own in the legislature. In the US Congress, representatives have great 
independence from their party and it is reasonable to seek a link between how they vote 
on legislation and the contributions they receive.  
 
In a study representative of many in the field, Snyder (1990) has found that an interest 
group has to give money over many years before it can influence policy. The meaning 
though of this influence is not clear. If environmentalists support a candidate through 
several elections in return for his support in the legislature, does this mean the candidate 
has been corrupted? Or  has he perhaps been won over by the arguments and the 
persistence of the lobby group? No one can really answer this question with authority. As 
David Adamany writes, “much less attention is given money to as a form of functional 
representation than to the very infrequent instances in which campaign gifts are made for the 
purpose of procuring action by public officials which would not have been forthcoming in 
the absence of contributions.” Public Choice scholars have perhaps focused too much on the 
potentially harmful effects of campaign finances and the manner in which government 
regulations can restrain these harmful effects.  
 
Studies that try to relate roll-call voting to contributions by particular groups have 
recently been joined by more macro studies such as those of Palda (1992) and later of 
Lott (2000). Both using statewide data sought to tie the size of campaign spending to the 
size of government. The idea behind these researches is that a large government is a prize 
over which interest groups will fight. Part of the resources spent in this fight are campaign advertising dollars. These studies suggest that campaign spending grows with 
the size of government.  
 
The Value of Campaign Spending 
 
Not all research into campaign spending is concerned purely with the links between 
spending and voters. A less well known branch of research into campaign spending has 
sought to determine whether campaign spending is simply rent-seeking expense or 
whether it contributes to educated debate on issues of public interest. Complicated 
theoretical models exist to support either position. Campaign spending may be harmful if 
politicians can consistently mislead voters, and if one believes that election campaigns 
are battles over a fixed pie of government resources rather than debates from which 
useful suggestions and ideas emerge for reforming government. In summarizing a large 
literature of laboratory studies and surveys, Crête (1991) concluded that  
 
1.  Election advertising increases voters’ knowledge of issues and candidates. 
2.  Message repetition (frequency) is an important factor in familiarizing voters with 
candidates and issues. 
3.  There is a connection between the issues candidates propose in their advertising 
and the issues the electorate cares about. 
4.  Candidates who take a position on the issues in their advertising rate higher with 
the electorate than those who do not. 
Coleman and Manna (2000) round out Crête’s summary in their study of 1994 and 1996 
House elections. Using survey data they find that “Campaign spending increases 
knowledge of and affect toward candidates, improves the public’s ability to place 
candidates on ideology and issue scales, and encourages certainty about those 
placements…Spending neither enhances nor erodes trust and efficacy in politics or 
attention and interest in campaigns.”  
 
If  public choice scholars with to conclusively pronounce themselves on the need for 
regulation of campaign finances they should understand that by closing one avenue to power such regulations will force electoral contestants to shift their efforts at influencing 
government to other avenues, such as back-room lobbying. The advantage may then go to 
those who are good at back-room lobbying rather than to those who are good at making a 
case directly to the public. This shift in regulated funds to less regulated uses is what 
Issacharoff and Karlan (1999) have called a “hydraulic effect” which could exacerbate 
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